Thursday, July 24, 2025

Was Muhammad Really Illiterate?

Was Muhammad Really Illiterate? A Critical Examination of the Traditional Islamic Claim

By Dr. Maxwell Shimba
Shimba Theological Institute


Abstract

One of the most widely asserted claims in Islamic theology is that Prophet Muhammad was illiterate, and that this illiteracy serves as proof of the divine origin of the Qur’an. This paper critically evaluates the historical, linguistic, and hadith-based evidence surrounding this claim. It also questions the theological implications of asserting Muhammad’s illiteracy as a miracle, demonstrating that both the premise and the conclusion are flawed. Further analysis is provided on the interpretation of the Arabic term ummiyy (ٱلْأُمِّيّ) and its contextual meaning, including a re-examination of hadiths that suggest Muhammad was capable of reading and writing.


1. Introduction

Muslims commonly argue that the illiteracy (ummiyy) of Prophet Muhammad is miraculous, positing that the literary excellence of the Qur’an could not have originated from an unlettered man. This reasoning, however, presumes two unverified claims: first, that Muhammad was indeed illiterate in the strict sense of being unable to read or write; and second, that the Qur’an was revealed in a purely oral form without any textual interaction by Muhammad. This paper questions both claims.


2. The Traditional Understanding of 'Ummiyy' (ٱلْأُمِّيّ)

In Islamic theology, Surah 7:157 refers to Muhammad as al-nabiyy al-ummiyy (ٱلنَّبِيُّ ٱلْأُمِّيُّ), usually translated as "the unlettered Prophet." However, the Arabic term ummiyy does not unambiguously mean “illiterate.” According to Edward William Lane in An Arabic-English Lexicon (1863, p. 92), ummiyy can also mean "gentile", especially when contrasted with Jewish or scriptural communities. This is supported by Surah 62:2, which describes Muhammad as being sent “to the ummiyyīn,” often interpreted as “to the gentiles.”

“It is He who has sent among the unlettered [ummiyyīn] a Messenger from themselves…” (Qur’an 62:2, Sahih International).

Thus, a textual-linguistic analysis suggests that ummiyy may refer to Muhammad’s lack of scriptural background (non-Jewish), rather than a lack of literacy. The conflation of ummiyy with “illiterate” lacks strong philological support.


3. Hadith Evidence Questioning Illiteracy

3.1 Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (Sahih al-Bukhari 2699)

One of the strongest arguments against Muhammad’s illiteracy arises during the drafting of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. The hadith in Sahih al-Bukhari (2699) records that the Prophet instructed Ali to strike out the phrase *“Messenger of Allah”* after the Quraysh objected. When Ali refused, Muhammad is said to have taken the treaty and made the change himself:

“So Allah's Messenger took the document and wrote…”
(Sahih al-Bukhari, 2699)

This moment contradicts the belief that Muhammad could neither read nor write. If he personally modified a treaty document, that indicates at least rudimentary literacy.

3.2 Final Illness and Request for Writing Tools (Sahih al-Bukhari 114; Sahih Muslim 1637a)

During Muhammad’s final illness, he is reported to have requested writing materials to leave a directive for his followers:

“Bring me a pen and paper so I may write for you a statement after which you will not go astray.”
(Sahih al-Bukhari, 114; Sahih Muslim, 1637a)

Although the Prophet’s request was interrupted and unfulfilled, the hadith strongly suggests his intent to write personally, undermining the assumption that he was incapable of writing.


4. Theological Implications and Logical Fallacy

Muslim apologists often argue that the Qur'an's existence as a literary work authored by an illiterate man is evidence of divine origin. However, this reasoning is circular and self-defeating:

  • First, it presupposes illiteracy as fact.

  • Second, it assumes that human literacy or illiteracy limits divine inspiration.

  • Third, it ignores the Qur'an’s posthumous compilation by literate scribes like Zayd ibn Thabit and others under Caliphs Abu Bakr and Uthman.

If Muhammad merely received and orally transmitted divine revelation, then his literacy status becomes irrelevant to the Qur’an’s composition. Furthermore, reliance on a claim of illiteracy to validate divine origin ignores better theological criteria, such as truthfulness, historical accuracy, and moral coherence.


5. Conclusion

The claim that Muhammad was illiterate is not conclusively supported by linguistic analysis or early Islamic sources. The use of ummiyy in the Qur’an likely refers to non-Jewish background rather than illiteracy. Additionally, key hadiths suggest Muhammad could read and write. Therefore, Muhammad’s supposed illiteracy should not be considered evidence for the divine origin of the Qur’an.


References

  1. Lane, Edward William. An Arabic-English Lexicon. London: Williams & Norgate, 1863.

  2. The Qur’an. Surah 7:157; 62:2. Translations: Sahih International.

  3. Sahih al-Bukhari, Hadith No. 2699.

  4. Sahih al-Bukhari, Hadith No. 114.

  5. Sahih Muslim, Hadith No. 1637a.

  6. Watt, W. Montgomery. Muhammad at Mecca. Oxford University Press, 1953.

  7. Guillaume, Alfred. The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah. Oxford University Press, 1955.


Author Bio
Dr. Maxwell Shimba is the founder and director of the Shimba Theological Institute. His academic interests include Islamic apologetics, comparative theology, and historical-critical analysis of religious texts.



Did Prophet Muhammad and His Companions Consume Wild Boar? Yes, they did

Title: An Inquiry into an Unconventional Hadith: Did Prophet Muhammad and His Companions Consume Wild Boar?

By Dr. Max Shimba | Max Shimba Ministries

Abstract:
This article critically examines a rare and controversial narration attributed to Al-Tabar, recorded in Al-Kitaab, Third Edition, Page 136, Hadith 41. The narration claims that Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and his companions consumed the meat of a wild boar during a time of exhaustion and hunger. This paper investigates the hadith’s content, chain of transmission, theological implications, and compatibility with Islamic dietary law (ḥalāl and ḥarām distinctions).


Introduction

Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) draws heavily from two foundational sources: the Qur'an and the Hadith (sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad). The Qur'an explicitly forbids the consumption of pork (Surah al-Baqarah 2:173, Surah al-Ma'idah 5:3, Surah al-An'am 6:145). Therefore, any narration that claims the Prophet of Islam consumed pork raises significant theological and historical questions.

The narration in question is reportedly recorded by Al-Tabar and transmitted via Ibn Ali Bakouri, who attributes it to a statement of ‘Aisha, the wife of the Prophet, regarding an incident in which the Prophet and his companions, after a long journey, allegedly consumed wild boar meat at the house of a woman named Fatimah.


The Hadith Text and Translation

Arabic Original (As Quoted):
والحديث رواه الطبر ، وردَّه ابن علي بكوري ، فسمع أصحاب رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم يقولون: سئم نبي الله وأصحابه من السفر الطويل. وصلوا إلى بيت فاطمة صديقة رفاقها. قال رسول الله: هل عندك ما تأكل؟ أجابت فاطمة بنعم. فسأل رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم إذا كان لك فريسة. فاطمة تجيب عندي خنزير بري. فأكل نبي الله وأصحابه لحم الخنزير البري حتى شبعوا.

English Translation:
The hadith is narrated by Al-Tabar and received by Ibn Ali Bakouri, who heard the companions of the Prophet of Allah say: The Prophet of Allah and his companions were weary from a long journey. They arrived at the house of Fatimah, a friend of their companions. The Prophet asked, "Do you have anything to eat?" Fatimah replied, "Yes." The Prophet asked again, "Do you have any prey?" Fatimah answered, "I have a wild boar." Then the Prophet of Allah and his companions ate wild boar meat until they were full.


Textual and Source Analysis

Upon preliminary review, several red flags emerge:

  1. The Source – Al-Tabar:
    The reference to “Al-Tabar” is ambiguous. It is unclear whether the author refers to Al-Ṭabarī (the famous 9th-century historian and exegete) or another lesser-known narrator. No such hadith is found in Al-Ṭabarī’s Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk or his Tafsīr. The name “Ibn Ali Bakouri” is also absent from any well-known isnād (chain of narration) records among Sunni or Shi'a traditions.

  2. Contradiction with Qur'anic Law:
    The Qur’an forbids the consumption of pork unequivocally (Qur’an 2:173; 5:3; 6:145; 16:115). Even in situations of necessity (darura), the Qur’an allows eating what is forbidden only when there is no alternative and when it is done out of survival, not desire (2:173). However, the tone of the narration here lacks the severity or desperation of such a context.

  3. Isnād and Matn Critique:
    This hadith does not appear in any of the six major hadith collections (Sahih Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Sunan Abu Dawood, Sunan al-Tirmidhi, Sunan al-Nasa’i, Sunan Ibn Majah), nor does it appear in known da‘if (weak) compilations. The isnād (chain of narrators) is both obscure and unverifiable, thus failing the criterion of sahih (authentic) or even hasan (acceptable).

  4. Terminology and Anachronism:
    The use of the phrase "wild boar" (khinzīr barrī) is highly unusual in classical Arabic hadith literature. Moreover, the name “Fatimah,” while common, may imply a conflation with Fatimah al-Zahra (daughter of the Prophet), which further complicates the narrative.


Theological and Doctrinal Implications

If accepted as authentic, this narration would directly contradict the Prophet’s teachings and Qur’anic revelation. However, Islamic theology maintains that the Prophet was protected (ma‘sūm) from sin and from violating divine law knowingly. The consumption of pork—wild or domesticated—is strictly ḥarām. To suggest the Prophet did otherwise undermines both his prophetic authority and the integrity of the Qur’anic revelation.


Conclusion

Upon textual, contextual, and theological scrutiny, this narration must be classified as fabricated (mawdū‘) or inauthentic. It is unsupported by any reliable chain of transmission and stands in stark contradiction to foundational Islamic teachings. It may represent a later polemical insertion or a forgery designed to provoke controversy.

Scholars and students of comparative religion must approach such claims with academic rigor and a critical eye toward historical methodology, isnād science, and theological coherence.


References

  1. The Qur'an: Surah al-Baqarah 2:173, Surah al-Ma'idah 5:3, Surah al-An'am 6:145, Surah al-Nahl 16:115

  2. Al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, ed. M. J. de Goeje

  3. Al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahih Muslim

  4. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, Lisan al-Mizan

  5. Goldziher, Ignaz. Muslim Studies, Vol. 2


Shalom,
Dr. Max Shimba
Max Shimba Ministries
www.maxshimbaministries.org



IS JESUS THE SON OF ALLAH?

By Dr. Maxwell Shimba | Max Shimba Ministries

Introduction

The late Muhammad, after failing to convince Christians to accept Islam using his own book—the Quran—resorted to referencing the Holy Bible to justify and defend the claims of Allah. However, upon examining both the Bible and Quran, significant theological contradictions arise—especially concerning the divine sonship of Jesus Christ.

1. The Testimony of Jesus Himself: He is the Son of God

The Gospel of John offers a powerful witness of Jesus’ claim to divinity:

“For this reason the Jews were seeking all the more to kill Him, because He was not only breaking the Sabbath, but was also calling God His own Father, making Himself equal with God. Therefore Jesus answered and said to them, ‘Truly, truly, I say to you, the Son can do nothing of Himself, unless it is something He sees the Father doing; for whatever the Father does, these things the Son also does in the same way. For the Father loves the Son and shows Him all things that He Himself is doing; and He will show Him greater works than these, so that you will be amazed. For just as the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so the Son also gives life to whom He wishes. For not even the Father judges anyone, but He has given all judgment to the Son, so that all will honor the Son just as they honor the Father. The one who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent Him. Truly, truly, I say to you, the one who hears My word, and believes Him who sent Me, has eternal life, and does not come into judgment, but has passed out of death into life.’”
John 5:18–24

This passage reveals Jesus’ intimate unity with the Father. He is not just a prophet or messenger; He claims divine equality with God.

2. The Arabic Bible Uses the Term "Allah"—But Does This Prove Doctrinal Consistency?

Muslims often argue that since the Arabic Bible uses the word "Allah" to refer to God, this proves that Allah of the Quran is the same as the God of the Bible. However, the mere use of the term is not enough—we must examine the attributes and identity associated with that name.

i. Allah in the Arabic Bible Has a Son

“And behold, a voice from heaven said, ‘This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.’”
Matthew 3:17

In Arabic:
"هذا هو ابني الحبيب الذي به سررت."
(Hadha huwa ibni al-habib aladhi bihi surirt.)

Here, the "Allah" of the Arabic Bible publicly acknowledges having a Son—Jesus Christ.

ii. The Son of God Is the Manifestation of God the Father

“Philip said to Him, ‘Lord, show us the Father, and it is enough for us.’ Jesus said to him, ‘Have I been with you for so long a time, and yet you have not come to know Me, Philip? The one who has seen Me has seen the Father.’”
John 14:8–9

This confirms that Jesus is the visible expression of the invisible God—fully divine and yet present in human form.

“I and the Father are one.”
John 10:30

“We know also that the Son of God has come and has given us understanding, so that we may know Him who is true. And we are in Him who is true by being in His Son Jesus Christ. He is the true God and eternal life.”
1 John 5:20

In Arabic:
"إنه الإله الحق والحياة الأبدية."
(Innahu al-ilah al-haqq wal-hayat al-abadia.)

Clearly, Jesus is not merely a prophet—He is the true God and eternal life.

3. The Quran’s Contradiction: Allah Has No Son

While the Bible affirms Jesus as the Son of God, the Quran explicitly denies this:

Surah Al-Ma’idah 5:72
“They have certainly disbelieved who say, ‘Allah is the Messiah, the son of Mary’ while the Messiah has said, ‘O Children of Israel, worship Allah, my Lord and your Lord.’ Indeed, he who associates others with Allah—Allah has forbidden him Paradise, and his refuge is the Fire. And there are not for the wrongdoers any helpers.”

This verse not only denies Jesus’ divinity but also threatens eternal punishment to those who confess Him as the Son of God. This stands in stark contradiction to the Gospel message of grace, redemption, and eternal life through Christ.

4. Misusing the Name "Allah" in the Bible

Just because the word "Allah" appears in the Arabic Bible does not mean the theological identity of the Quranic Allah is the same as the Biblical God. Even Satan is mentioned in the Bible, including the Arabic version:

“And even if our gospel is veiled, it is veiled to those who are perishing, in whose case the god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelieving…”
2 Corinthians 4:3–4

The term “god” can refer to false deities or Satan himself. What matters are the characteristics, nature, and attributes associated with the name.

5. Divine Confirmation of the Sonship of Jesus

“While he was speaking, a cloud appeared and covered them, and they were afraid as they entered the cloud. Then a voice came from the cloud, saying, ‘This is My Son, whom I have chosen; listen to Him.’”
Luke 9:34–35

In Arabic:
"هذا هو ابني الذي اخترته. اسمعوا له."
(Hadha huwa ibni alladhi ikhtartuhu. Isma'uu lahu.)

This is a direct divine declaration from God the Father concerning Jesus' identity.

Conclusion

Muslims often assert that the word "Allah" in the Arabic Bible proves theological unity with Christianity. However, the God of the Bible has a Son—Jesus Christ—while the Allah of the Quran categorically denies having a son. This contradiction exposes a theological divide that cannot be bridged by linguistic similarities.

Key Question:

Do Muslims now accept that their Allah has a Son—Jesus Christ—as the Bible clearly proclaims?

If not, then they must reconsider the claim that Allah of the Quran is the same as the God of the Bible.

Shalom,

Dr. Maxwell Shimba
Max Shimba Ministries



The Primary Characteristic of a Kafir: Denial that Jesus is the Son of God

The Primary Characteristic of a Kafir: Denial that Jesus is the Son of God

By Dr. Max Shimba, Servant of Jesus Christ, our Great God and Savior – Titus 2:13


Introduction

Many people are unfamiliar with the true meaning and implications of the term Kafir. In common discourse, the term is often misunderstood or used pejoratively. However, in its linguistic and religious context, Kafir is not an insult but a descriptive term referring to someone who rejects, opposes, or goes against a particular faith or religious truth.

The Arabic term Kafir originates from the root meaning “to cover” or “to conceal.” In Islamic theology, it generally denotes a non-believer, someone who rejects the truth of Islam. But from a biblical standpoint, and based on historical chronology and divine revelation, we are compelled to evaluate who truly embodies this title.

This article sets out to explore, through both biblical and Islamic sources, the defining characteristics of a Kafir, particularly in the context of those who deny the divinely revealed identity of Jesus Christ as the Son of God.


Biblical Testimony Precedes the Qur'an

The Holy Bible predates the Qur'an by approximately 632 years. In the Gospel of Luke, the angel Gabriel clearly declares the divine identity of Jesus:

Luke 1:30–31, 35 (NKJV)

"Then the angel said to her, “Do not be afraid, Mary, for you have found favor with God. And behold, you will conceive in your womb and bring forth a Son, and shall call His name Jesus. [...] The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Highest will overshadow you; therefore, also, that Holy One who is to be born will be called the Son of God.”

This angelic proclamation, delivered directly from the throne of Jehovah (YHWH), identifies Jesus as the Son of God. Notably, for over six centuries, there is no recorded divine objection to this revelation.

It is only with the advent of Muhammad and the Qur'an that we find the outright denial of this foundational Christian truth.


Qur'anic Denial of Jesus as the Son of God

The Qur'an, composed over six centuries after the New Testament, emphatically denies Jesus' divine sonship. Consider the following verses:

Surah Al-Ma'idah (5:72–73):

“They have certainly disbelieved who say, ‘Allah is the Messiah, the son of Mary’ while the Messiah has said, ‘O Children of Israel, worship Allah, my Lord and your Lord.’ Indeed, he who associates others with Allah – Allah has forbidden him Paradise, and his refuge is the Fire.”

“They have certainly disbelieved who say, ‘Allah is one of three.’ There is no deity except one God.”

Surah Al-Ma'idah (5:75):

“The Messiah, son of Mary, was no more than a messenger; many were the messengers that passed away before him. His mother was a truthful woman. They both used to eat food…”

These verses demonstrate a categorical rejection of the divinity of Jesus and His designation as the Son of God. The Qur’an reduces Christ to a mere prophet and explicitly opposes the Christian Trinitarian understanding of God.

This denial is not incidental—it is intentional opposition to what God had already declared centuries earlier through the Bible. The one who comes after divine revelation and contradicts it fits precisely the biblical definition of one who opposes God’s truth—a Kafir.


Who, Then, Is a Kafir According to the Bible?

The Bible provides a clear criterion for discerning the spirit of truth from the spirit of error. The Apostle John writes:

1 John 4:1–3 (NKJV):

“Beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits, whether they are of God; because many false prophets have gone out into the world. By this you know the Spirit of God: Every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is of God, and every spirit that does not confess that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is not of God. And this is the spirit of the Antichrist…”

The spirit of the Antichrist is defined as any teaching that denies Jesus Christ came in the flesh as the Son of God. This includes ideologies that reject His incarnation, divinity, or messianic identity. Islam’s rejection of Jesus’ sonship places it in direct conflict with biblical doctrine and aligns it with the spirit of Antichrist.

2 John 1:7:

“For many deceivers have gone out into the world who do not confess Jesus Christ as coming in the flesh. This is a deceiver and an antichrist.”

1 John 2:22:

“Who is the liar? It is whoever denies that Jesus is the Christ. Such a person is the antichrist—denying the Father and the Son.”

Therefore, anyone—regardless of title or religious claims—who denies Jesus as the Son of God is biblically identified as an Antichrist and hence a Kafir in the truest spiritual sense.


Allah’s Opposition to Jehovah’s Revelation

An important question arises: If Jehovah, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, already declared Jesus as His Son centuries before the Qur’an, why did Allah contradict this? Where was Allah during the previous revelations?

Is Allah now claiming to override Jehovah’s declaration? Such theological reversal, centuries after established divine truth, is a definitive trait of a Kafir—one who rejects and opposes previous, divinely revealed truth.


Clarifying the Term ‘Kafir’

To be clear: Kafir is not a slur. It is a descriptor. Just as one may be called a footballer, preacher, or sinner based on what they do or believe, a Kafir is simply one who rejects the truth, particularly the truth of God revealed in earlier Scripture.

Muslims, by rejecting Jesus as the Son of God, not only contradict biblical truth but also inherit the full description of a Kafir as defined both linguistically and theologically: a denier of divine truth, a rejecter of God’s revealed Word.


Conclusion

The biblical and linguistic evidence is overwhelming: denial of Jesus as the Son of God is the chief mark of a Kafir. Since Islam categorically denies this truth, and opposes the divine identity of Jesus Christ, it falls under the very definition it often applies to others.

To those who reject Jesus’ divine sonship, we extend not hatred but clarity. We identify, based on Scripture, that such rejection places one in the realm of unbelief and opposition to God.

May God, through His grace and truth, open eyes to the revelation of His Son, Jesus Christ, the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth (John 1:14).


Shalom.
Max Shimba
Servant of Jesus Christ, Our Great God and Savior – Titus 2:13



Who Is the Last Prophet According to the Quran? Isa Bin Maryam or Muhammad?

 Title: Who Is the Last Prophet According to the Quran? A Theological and Logical Inquiry into the Finality of Prophethood

By Dr. Maxwell Shimba | Shimba Theological Institute


Abstract

Islamic theology insists that Muhammad is the final prophet, the “Seal of the Prophets” (Khatam an-Nabiyyin). This doctrine is foundational to Islam and is affirmed in the Qur’an in Surah Al-Ahzab 33:40. However, multiple Islamic traditions (Hadith and exegeses) suggest the eschatological return of Isa bin Maryam (Jesus, son of Mary), not merely as a righteous follower but as a ruling judge and prophet-like figure, raising profound theological and logical challenges. If Muhammad is the last prophet, what exactly will Isa be upon his return? If Isa still holds a prophetic role, has the Quran contradicted itself by declaring Muhammad as the final prophet? This paper explores the apparent paradox and raises critical academic and theological questions aimed at stimulating scholarly debate within Islamic and interfaith studies.


Introduction

The doctrine of the finality of prophethood is central to Islamic belief. Surah Al-Ahzab 33:40 clearly states:

“Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but he is the Messenger of Allah and the Seal of the Prophets (Khatam an-Nabiyyin).”

This verse has historically been interpreted by the majority of Muslim scholars to mean that no prophet will come after Muhammad. Yet, Islamic eschatology—through both Hadith and tafsir literature—asserts the future return of Isa bin Maryam (Jesus), who will descend from heaven, defeat the Dajjal (Antichrist), and rule the earth in justice.

Thus arises the central contradiction: If Muhammad is the final prophet, what prophetic authority—if any—will Jesus exercise upon his return?


Key Quranic and Hadith Sources

  • Qur’an 33:40 – Affirms Muhammad as the Seal of Prophets.

  • Qur’an 4:157–159 – States that Jesus was not crucified, but was raised up to Allah and will return.

  • Sahih al-Bukhari (Book 55, Hadith 657) – Says that Jesus will descend as a just ruler and break the cross.

  • Sahih Muslim (Book 1, Hadith 293) – "There is no prophet between me and him [Jesus] and he shall descend."

This last hadith particularly raises theological tension. If no prophet stands between Muhammad and Jesus, then does Jesus retain his prophetic status after Muhammad? And does his descent not revive the institution of prophethood after Muhammad’s era, violating the principle of finality?


Core Theological Questions and Contradictions

  1. Does the Quran contradict itself by declaring Muhammad as the last prophet, yet affirming the eschatological return of a former prophet?

  2. Is Isa bin Maryam stripped of his prophetic role upon return? If so, where is this clearly stated in the Quran or Hadith? If not, then does his return constitute a prophetic reactivation?

  3. Can a prophet return and function as a judge and religious leader without exercising prophethood? If so, how is this different from his previous prophetic mission?

  4. If Isa’s return involves religious leadership and issuing judgments in accordance with divine guidance, how does that not constitute prophethood?

  5. If Muhammad is the final prophet, how do we interpret Jesus’ return in light of Surah Al-Ahzab 33:40? Is there an exception clause that the Quran or Allah omitted or forgot?

  6. Is Isa bin Maryam’s second coming essentially a loophole in the theology of finality? If Allah is omniscient, why make a definitive finality claim knowing Jesus would return?

  7. Will Isa receive divine revelation upon return, or act solely based on earlier teachings? If he receives new guidance, is that not revelation, and thus a resumption of prophethood?


Islamic Responses and Critical Evaluation

Islamic apologists often argue that Jesus will not return as a prophet but as a follower of Muhammad, thereby not violating the doctrine of finality. However, this explanation raises its own set of contradictions:

  • If Jesus returns as a follower, does he cease to be a prophet? Can a prophet ever stop being a prophet once ordained by God?

  • If Jesus will lead prayers, judge disputes, and execute divine law, is this not the functional essence of a prophet’s role, regardless of formal title?

  • If Isa will break crosses and correct Christian theology, how is that not a new mission—thus new prophethood?

This approach appears to diminish the original authority of Isa bin Maryam while simultaneously using him as a divine agent in end-time theology. This inconsistency reflects a theological patchwork rather than coherent divine planning.


A Debate of Divine Logic: Allah’s Oversight or Intentional Contradiction?

Let us consider two possibilities:

  • Scenario 1: Allah declared Muhammad as the last prophet, fully aware Isa would return as a prophet.

    • Then Allah intentionally created a contradiction between Quran and Hadith, misleading generations of Muslims about the true nature of finality.

  • Scenario 2: Allah forgot or overlooked Isa’s return when revealing Quran 33:40.

    • Then the omniscience of Allah is called into question, implying divine forgetfulness or inconsistency.

Either scenario damages the internal consistency and theological coherence of the Quran.


Conclusion

The return of Isa bin Maryam as both a religious judge and a righteous leader poses serious theological dilemmas for the Islamic claim that Muhammad is the final prophet. The Qur’an affirms Muhammad’s finality, yet the Hadith affirms Isa’s return—a former prophet returning to act in what appears to be a prophetic capacity. Either Islam must admit Isa is the final prophet by virtue of his return, or concede that the doctrine of finality is compromised by exception, leading to divine inconsistency.

This contradiction invites further theological scrutiny. If Isa can return and function in prophetic authority, how final was Muhammad's finality? If not a prophet, then what will Isa be—a demoted messenger? A spiritual judge with no divine office?


Suggested Areas for Further Research and Debate

  • Comparative analysis with Christian eschatology: Does Jesus return in a different office in both religions?

  • Philosophical implications of divine inconsistency.

  • Role of Hadith versus Quran in shaping Islamic doctrine.

  • Analysis of classical tafsir literature on Jesus’ second coming.


By Dr. Maxwell Shimba
Founder, Shimba Theological Institute
Theologian, Apologist, Researcher



The Similitude of Shame and the Symbolism of Covering: A Comparative Analysis of Genesis 38:15, the Islamic Veil, and the Kaaba’s Black Cloth

 Journal Article for Submission

Title: The Similitude of Shame and the Symbolism of Covering: A Comparative Analysis of Genesis 38:15, the Islamic Veil, and the Kaaba’s Black Cloth
Author: Dr. Maxwell Shimba, Shimba Theological Institute, New York, NY


Abstract
This paper explores the theological and anthropological implications of covering in Abrahamic traditions, with a special focus on Genesis 38:15 and its symbolic connection to the Islamic practice of veiling and the draping of the Kaaba in a black cloth (Kiswah). Through a comparative exegetical approach, the study highlights how both traditions associate physical covering with shame, honor, and sacredness. It further scrutinizes the paradox in Islam where symbols associated with shame in the biblical context are institutionalized as marks of piety and sanctity, thereby examining the ideological transformation and religious reappropriation of symbols across religious traditions.


1. Introduction

The act of covering—be it of the body or of sacred spaces—has always held a profound place within Abrahamic religious thought. Genesis 38:15 presents a vivid narrative that associates the act of veiling with prostitution and deception, while in Islam, veiling is presented as a symbol of modesty and religious virtue. Simultaneously, the Kaaba, Islam’s most sacred site, is covered in black cloth, inviting comparison with the black veil often worn by Muslim women. This paper investigates the tension between the biblical understanding of covering as an act linked with shame and deception, and the Islamic reinterpretation of the same as an emblem of piety and sanctity.


2. Genesis 38:15 – Veiling and Prostitution

Genesis 38:15 states:

“When Judah saw her, he thought she was a harlot; because she had covered her face.” (KJV)

In this passage, Tamar, Judah's daughter-in-law, disguises herself as a prostitute by veiling herself, prompting Judah to mistake her identity. The text implies a cultural norm in which women who covered themselves—especially in public—could be identified with harlotry, at least under suspicious circumstances. The covering here is a tool of deception and sexual ambiguity, serving as a visual marker that confounds identity and invites sexual transaction.

This narrative reflects an early Near Eastern view that associates facial veiling with specific social roles—particularly harlotry. Thus, covering is not a neutral act but one imbued with societal expectations and moral connotations. The veil hides, protects, or manipulates identity, depending on context, and is not inherently virtuous.


3. The Islamic Veil and its Transformation of Symbolism

Contrary to the implications of Genesis 38:15, Islamic tradition elevates the practice of veiling to a religious command rooted in modesty (haya) and honor. The Quran prescribes covering for believing women in Surah An-Nur (24:31) and Surah Al-Ahzab (33:59), emphasizing that women should draw their garments over themselves to be recognized as respectable and to avoid harassment.

The black veil—niqab, hijab, or abaya—serves multiple religious and sociopolitical functions: identity affirmation, communal belonging, religious obedience, and social modesty. The theological inversion is striking: what was once a symbol of shame and sexual deception in Genesis is transformed into a religious obligation and badge of honor in Islam.

This transformation is not merely interpretive but ideological. The veil is reappropriated, stripped of its biblical associations with sin and deception, and vested with spiritual purity and obedience. The Islamic veil thus becomes a tool for counter-narrative: reclaiming what once represented disgrace as a form of sanctity and dignity.


4. The Kaaba and the Black Cloth: A Sacred Covering

The Kaaba in Mecca, Islam’s holiest site, is annually draped in a black silk cloth known as the Kiswah, inscribed with verses from the Quran in gold thread. This practice is considered an act of veneration, conferring sacredness and majesty upon the structure.

From a biblical perspective, the color black and the act of covering are often associated with mourning, concealment, or judgment (cf. Lamentations 4:8; Joel 2:6). In Islamic practice, however, the black cloth becomes an emblem of divine majesty and unity. Again, we witness a symbolic reversal: blackness and covering, which carry connotations of darkness, sin, or disgrace in biblical literature, are invested with honor and sacredness in Islam.

The theological irony cannot be overstated. A symbol of human shame and deception in Genesis—black covering—is now used to veil the house of Allah and the bodies of Muslim women alike.


5. The Similitude of Shame: Between Biblical Symbolism and Islamic Ritual

The covering in Genesis 38:15 was used deceptively and brought about moral scandal. In contrast, Islam institutionalizes the covering of both persons and places as acts of moral uprightness. However, this raises a critical theological and anthropological question: Does Islam merely invert symbols, or does it fundamentally misinterpret the moral universals embedded in earlier scriptures?

Islam, while claiming continuity with Judeo-Christian tradition, seems to recontextualize symbols without reconciling their original meanings. The veil, once a tool of prostitution and disguise, is turned into a sign of religious fidelity. The black cloth that may connote sin and obscurity now wraps the most sacred Islamic site.

This juxtaposition leads us to ask: Is Islam a continuation, distortion, or contradiction of the Abrahamic tradition it claims to uphold? The covering becomes a simulacrum—an image detached from its original reference—adopted and re-signified.


6. Conclusion: Symbolism and Sacred Misappropriation

The theological dissonance between Genesis 38:15 and Islamic covering practices reveals a deeper hermeneutical chasm. The veil, and the black cloth, once associated with concealment and moral ambiguity, are appropriated in Islam as sacred and pure.

This paper suggests that Islam does not preserve the original moral symbolism of covering but inverts it, transforming what was shameful into a religious obligation. The simulacrum of sanctity built upon inverted biblical symbols reflects Islam’s broader pattern of theological appropriation—adopting Judeo-Christian imagery while emptying it of its original moral context.

As such, the similitude of shame in both traditions is not merely symbolic, but evidential of a deeper theological divergence. What the Bible calls deception and shame, Islam calls modesty and sacredness. The question remains: can truth and falsehood be cloaked in the same garment?


Bibliography

  • Holy Bible, King James Version. Genesis 38:15.

  • The Quran. Surah An-Nur (24:31); Surah Al-Ahzab (33:59).

  • Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji. Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change. International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1980.

  • El-Guindi, Fadwa. Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance. Berg Publishers, 1999.

  • Patai, Raphael. The Arab Mind. Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973.

  • Biale, David. Eros and the Jews: From Biblical Israel to Contemporary America. University of California Press, 1992.

  • Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. Ideals and Realities of Islam. ABC International Group, 2000.

  • Milgrom, Jacob. Leviticus: A Book of Ritual and Ethics. Fortress Press, 2004.



The Ethical Crisis of Child Marriage in Religious History

Title:
The Ethical Crisis of Child Marriage in Religious History: A Critical Examination of the Quranic Tradition in Modern Context

Author:
Dr. Maxwell Shimba
Shimba Theological Institute


Abstract

This paper critically examines the morally and scientifically indefensible practice of child marriage through the lens of Islamic tradition, specifically the Prophet Muhammad’s reported marriage to Aisha at the age of nine. While acknowledging the historical context of 7th-century Arabia, the article evaluates the enduring influence of this precedent in Islamic jurisprudence and its incompatibility with contemporary ethical, psychological, and human rights standards. A comparative reflection is drawn with Judeo-Christian traditions to underscore a broader discourse on prophetic morality, child protection, and the evolution of ethical norms in modern civilization.


Introduction

Religious traditions have historically shaped moral paradigms, yet not all ancient practices withstand the scrutiny of contemporary ethical standards. One such contested practice is child marriage, particularly within Islamic tradition where it is recorded that the Prophet Muhammad consummated a marriage with Aisha when she was nine years old (Sahih al-Bukhari, 5133). While this event is often contextualized within 7th-century Arabian norms, its ongoing justification in parts of the Muslim world raises significant ethical concerns in light of modern legal and psychological understanding. This article interrogates this practice from a multidisciplinary standpoint—religious history, psychology, child development, and international human rights—to assess its moral standing today.


Historical Context and Islamic Jurisprudence

According to Sunni canonical hadiths (e.g., Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim), Aisha was six years old at betrothal and nine at the time of consummation (al-Bukhari, 5133; Muslim, 1422a). Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) traditionally permits marriage upon the onset of puberty, with some schools considering consummation acceptable at or even before this threshold, if permitted by a guardian (wali). Classical scholars like Al-Shafi‘i and Ibn Qudamah accepted this norm, interpreting the Prophet’s conduct as eternally valid.

However, this view reflects cultural realities of pre-modern tribal societies that lacked contemporary scientific understanding of childhood, adolescence, or neurodevelopment. In such contexts, survival imperatives and social structures normalized early marriage to secure tribal alliances or progeny. Yet invoking these precedents today to validate child marriage undermines both moral progress and scientific consensus on child welfare.


Scientific and Psychological Framework

Modern developmental psychology and neuroscience have drastically altered our understanding of childhood. Studies by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2018) and the American Psychological Association (APA, 2020) confirm that individuals below 18 lack the neurological and emotional maturity required to make informed marital or sexual decisions. The prefrontal cortex, governing moral reasoning and impulse control, remains underdeveloped until approximately age 25 (Steinberg, 2013). Furthermore, early sexual activity correlates with trauma, depression, PTSD, and adverse physical health outcomes, including increased maternal and infant mortality (UNICEF, 2022).

Therefore, from a scientific standpoint, child marriage is neither developmentally appropriate nor medically safe. It violates not only individual health but foundational principles of consent and autonomy.


Ethical and Legal Considerations

From an ethical viewpoint, child marriage is a form of structural violence and coercion. Philosophers like Immanuel Kant, who emphasized the inviolable dignity of the human person, would categorically reject such practices. In modern legal frameworks, child marriage constitutes statutory rape, irrespective of cultural or religious justifications. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), ratified by nearly all nations, defines a child as anyone under 18 and urges states to protect children from sexual exploitation and forced marriage (UNCRC, 1989).

Moreover, institutions like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International continue to denounce child marriage as a gross human rights violation, especially where religious justifications are used to bypass state laws or international conventions. Thus, any perpetuation of such practice today, whether grounded in religious texts or not, stands in violation of both human rights law and moral reason.


Comparative Perspective: Christianity and Prophetic Morality

In the Judeo-Christian tradition, patriarchs such as Abraham, David, and Solomon engaged in polygamy and maintained concubines. However, contemporary Christian theology does not regard these figures as moral exemplars in the context of marriage or sexual ethics. Rather, their actions are interpreted as descriptive of historical culture, not prescriptive of divine morality. Jesus Christ, who is held as the sinless moral exemplar in Christian theology, neither married nor engaged in polygamy, and His teachings emphasize monogamy, mutual respect, and the protection of the vulnerable (Matthew 19:4–6).

Islamic theology, by contrast, treats Muhammad as uswa ḥasana ("the perfect example") whose actions are often considered binding. This theological position makes ethical evaluation of his conduct not merely historical but normative. Therefore, if a figure is believed to be divinely guided and morally exemplary, yet engages in behavior that modern consensus deems harmful—such as child marriage—then the legitimacy of that claim must be critically re-evaluated in light of both historical context and contemporary ethics.


Conclusion

The enduring veneration of practices like child marriage based on religious precedent poses a profound ethical dilemma in the modern era. While historical context may explain such actions, it does not morally justify their perpetuation today. Religious traditions must be subject to critical scrutiny, especially when their prescriptions conflict with universal principles of human dignity, psychological health, and legal standards of child protection. To uphold the marriage of a minor—such as a 9-year-old—as morally exemplary is to regress from centuries of moral and legal progress. In modern civilization, the standard for moral authority must be anchored not in historical literalism but in an unwavering commitment to human rights and the protection of the most vulnerable.


References

  • Al-Bukhari, M. I. (n.d.). Sahih al-Bukhari, Hadith 5133.

  • Al-Muslim, I. H. (n.d.). Sahih Muslim, Hadith 1422a.

  • American Psychological Association (APA). (2020). Child development and capacity for consent. Washington, D.C.

  • Kant, I. (1785). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press.

  • Steinberg, L. (2013). The influence of neuroscience on U.S. Supreme Court decisions about adolescents’ criminal culpability. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14(7), 513–518.

  • UNICEF. (2022). Ending child marriage: A global imperative. New York.

  • United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). (1989). Treaty Series, vol. 1577.

  • World Health Organization. (2018). Adolescent health and development. Geneva.

  • Human Rights Watch. (2021). Child Marriage: Global Statistics and Impact.

  • Amnesty International. (2022). The Right to Say No: Ending Forced and Child Marriages.


Author Bio
Dr. Maxwell Shimba is the Founder of Shimba Theological Institute and an interdisciplinary scholar in theology, ethics, and human rights. His academic work interrogates the intersections of religious tradition and modern moral consciousness.



IN CHRIST, ALL THINGS WERE CREATED

IN CHRIST, ALL THINGS WERE CREATED: A Christological Reflection on Colossians 1:16

By Dr. Max Shimba
Servant of Jesus Christ, Shimba Theological Institute


Abstract

This article explores the Christological implications of Colossians 1:16, emphasizing the divine role of Jesus Christ in creation. The verse reveals a profound theological claim: that all things—visible and invisible, in heaven and on earth—were created in, through, and for Christ. This paper argues that such a declaration affirms not only the divinity of Christ but also His role as Creator, thereby identifying Him as God. Drawing from both Pauline and Johannine texts, this study asserts that Jesus is the eternal Logos and the ultimate end of all created reality.


Keywords: Christology, Colossians 1:16, Creation, Divinity of Christ, Logos Theology, Pauline Epistles


1. Introduction

Among the most elevated Christological passages in the Pauline epistles is Colossians 1:15–20, wherein the apostle Paul expounds on the supremacy of Christ. Verse 16, in particular, makes an extraordinary claim:

"For in Him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things have been created through Him and for Him" (Col. 1:16, NIV).

This verse establishes the cosmic role of Jesus Christ in creation and positions Him not as a created being, but as the very source, means, and goal of all created things. Such a claim demands a theological examination of Jesus’ identity, divinity, and His relationship with God the Father.


2. Christ as the Sphere and Agent of Creation

The Greek phrase ἐν αὐτῷ (en autō), translated “in Him,” signifies more than a mere association. It indicates that Christ is the foundational sphere within which creation occurred. This idea resonates with Johannine theology:

“Through Him all things were made; without Him nothing was made that has been made” (John 1:3, NIV).

Both Paul and John affirm that Christ is not a passive instrument of creation but its initiating and sustaining cause. He is the eternal Logos (Word) through whom the universe was brought into existence.


3. Christ’s Role in Visible and Invisible Creation

Paul delineates the extent of Christ’s creative work: “things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible.” This includes both physical realities (cosmos, nature, humanity) and metaphysical entities (angelic beings, spiritual authorities). The mention of “thrones,” “dominions,” “rulers,” and “authorities” further emphasizes Christ’s supremacy over all cosmic powers—whether demonic or angelic, earthly or celestial.


4. Christ as Divine Creator

Genesis 1:1 asserts that God created the heavens and the earth. For Paul to attribute this creative function to Christ is to declare unequivocally that Christ is God. This theological conclusion finds additional support in Hebrews 1:2–3, which states:

“Through the Son He made the universe... The Son is the radiance of God’s glory and the exact representation of His being” (Heb. 1:2–3, NIV).

Jesus’ divinity is not a later invention of Church councils but a truth embedded within the earliest apostolic witness.


5. All Things Were Created For Him

Paul completes the verse with the phrase “and for Him” (εἰς αὐτόνeis auton), indicating Christ’s teleological centrality in creation. All things exist not only through Christ but for Christ. This eschatological vision positions Christ as both Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end (Rev. 22:13). Creation finds its purpose, meaning, and destiny in Him.


6. Conclusion

Colossians 1:16 is a doctrinally rich verse that places Christ at the center of all created reality. The Apostle Paul makes three essential claims:

  1. All things were created in Him – He is the realm or origin of creation.

  2. All things were created through Him – He is the agent or means of creation.

  3. All things were created for Him – He is the purpose or goal of creation.

These affirmations align with both Old and New Testament declarations about God's creative work and show that Jesus shares in the divine identity of the Creator. He is not merely the Messiah; He is God incarnate, the Lord of all creation.


References

Carson, D. A., and Douglas J. Moo. 2005. An Introduction to the New Testament. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.

Holy Bible, New International Version. 2011. Colorado Springs: Biblica.

O’Brien, Peter T. 1982. Colossians, Philemon. Word Biblical Commentary, Vol. 44. Waco, TX: Word Books.

Wright, N. T. 1986. The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon: An Introduction and Commentary. Tyndale New Testament Commentaries. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic.

Shimba, Max. 2024. Christology and Divine Identity: Reflections from Pauline Theology. Orlando, FL: Shimba Theological Institute.



The Throne, Deity, and Kingdom of Christ: A Theological Analysis of Hebrews 1:8

The Throne, Deity, and Kingdom of Christ: A Theological Analysis of Hebrews 1:8

Dr. Maxwell Shimba
Shimba Theological Institute, New York, NY
Servant of Jesus Christ, the Most High God


Abstract

This article explores the divinity of Jesus Christ as declared by God the Father in Hebrews 1:8. The verse affirms Christ’s eternal throne, His identity as God, and His rightful kingship. The author contends that advanced theological training is not required to understand the clarity and profundity of this passage. The verse offers substantial doctrinal weight to the divinity and kingship of Christ within the framework of Trinitarian theology.


Introduction

The identity and divinity of Jesus Christ remain central to Christian theology. Among the scriptural affirmations of His divine nature, Hebrews 1:8 is particularly significant. The uniqueness of this verse lies in the fact that it is God the Father Himself who addresses the Son as God, assigning to Him an everlasting throne and a kingdom founded on righteousness. This paper provides an exegetical and theological reflection on Hebrews 1:8, arguing for the affirmation of the Son's divinity, eternal reign, and ontological unity with the Father.


Textual Foundation: Hebrews 1:8

“But unto the Son He saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of thy kingdom.” (Hebrews 1:8, KJV)

The verse is a direct quotation from Psalm 45:6–7, applied in the New Testament context to Christ. This divine utterance from the Father to the Son encapsulates three theologically critical declarations:

1. Jesus Has a Throne

The possession of a throne indicates royal authority and dominion. In biblical theology, a throne is the seat of power, judgment, and eternal governance. The phrase “Thy throne” places the Son in a position of ultimate sovereignty.

2. Jesus Is Called God

The Father’s address to the Son, “O God,” is not metaphorical but literal. The Greek phrase ho theos (ὁ Θεός) is the definitive form of divine designation in the New Testament. Here, the Father explicitly identifies the Son as God, affirming His full divinity.

3. Jesus Rules Over an Eternal and Righteous Kingdom

The duration of Christ's reign—“forever and ever”—points to His eternal kingship. Furthermore, the "sceptre of righteousness" denotes moral perfection and justice in His governance. This is not a temporary or symbolic rule, but a literal, eternal kingdom.


Theological Implications

Hebrews 1:8 offers a high Christology and is foundational to the doctrine of the Trinity. Its implications are manifold:

  • Christ’s Eternal Reign: Distinguishes Him from all created beings, including angels, who are mentioned earlier in the chapter as ministering spirits (Heb. 1:7, 14).

  • Christ’s Divine Identity: Supports the Nicene affirmation of the Son being “of one substance with the Father.”

  • Christ’s Kingdom: Offers hope and assurance to believers that His reign is both just and everlasting.

This verse undermines any theological position that diminishes the full deity or eternal authority of Jesus Christ.


Conclusion

Hebrews 1:8 offers a clear and authoritative proclamation concerning the identity of Jesus Christ. It reveals that:

  • Jesus has a throne — He reigns eternally.

  • Jesus is God — Confirmed by the Father’s direct declaration.

  • Jesus has a righteous kingdom — Governed with divine justice.

No advanced academic degree is needed to grasp the power and clarity of this Scripture. Yet its implications support some of the most essential truths in systematic theology. God the Father Himself settles the debate regarding Christ’s identity: Jesus is God, King, and eternal Ruler.


References

Bruce, F. F. (1990). The Epistle to the Hebrews (Revised ed.). Eerdmans.

Grudem, W. (1994). Systematic theology: An introduction to biblical doctrine. Zondervan.

Lane, W. L. (1991). Hebrews 1–8 (Word Biblical Commentary, Vol. 47A). Thomas Nelson.

MacArthur, J. (1983). Hebrews: Christ—Perfect sacrifice, perfect priest. Moody Publishers.

Morris, L. (1989). Jesus is the Christ: Studies in the theology of John. Eerdmans.

The Holy Bible, King James Version. (n.d.). Thomas Nelson.



 

The Silence of the Garden

The Silence of the Garden: A Parable of Withered Innocence and the Ethics of Child Protection in Religious Contexts

Dr. Maxwell Shimba
USA Theological University, Orlando, FL


Abstract

This article presents and analyzes a parable—The Silence of the Garden—as a theological and ethical allegory confronting child exploitation sanctioned or overlooked within certain religious contexts, particularly in some interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence. Through symbolic language, the narrative critiques the manipulation of sacred texts, the failure of religious guardianship, and the consequences of institutional silence on the innocence of children. The article draws upon theological ethics, child rights frameworks, and reformist Islamic scholarship to advocate for a renewed commitment to justice, particularly the protection of children from harmful traditions rooted in patriarchal and historical legal norms. By reframing religious silence not as consent but as complicity, the article argues that ethical integrity demands an unambiguous denunciation of harmful practices—regardless of religious or cultural origin.


1. Introduction

Religious communities across the world hold moral and spiritual authority in high esteem, often entrusting clerics, scholars, and traditions with guidance over social conduct and familial structures. However, when religious authority is invoked to justify the violation of the vulnerable—especially children—it becomes necessary to scrutinize such frameworks with both theological integrity and ethical urgency. The parable “The Silence of the Garden” functions as a literary-theological critique of the ways in which innocence can be sacrificed at the altar of unexamined tradition and unchecked authority.

This article engages the parable as a case study in moral theology, drawing attention to the defense of child marriage and other forms of abuse through religious texts. It places particular focus on interpretations within Islamic jurisprudence, while recognizing that such ethical lapses are not exclusive to Islam, but shared across many religious histories. The parable thus becomes a tool for advocacy: a quiet scream for reform in the name of justice, dignity, and divine compassion.


2. The Parable as Ethical Allegory

In the parable, the “garden” represents a moral community, vibrant and full of promise, yet subject to decay not from nature, but from internal betrayal. The “flowers” are children, vulnerable and reliant on caregivers for protection and nourishment. The “guardians” are figures of religious authority, who instead of nurturing, exploit. What begins as metaphor soon reveals itself as a critique of child abuse facilitated or ignored by religious institutions.

The silence referenced throughout is not merely the absence of protest—it is symbolic of societal complicity. Parents silencing their children, theologians defending harmful practices, and communities protecting religious reputations over justice all contribute to the withering of the garden. The parable’s power lies in its moral clarity: “Silence is not consent. The Book may not mention every evil, but that does not bless its existence.”


3. Scriptural Silence vs. Ethical Accountability

One of the parable’s key theological insights is its challenge to the logic that “what is not prohibited is permitted.” This interpretive method, common in some pre-modern jurisprudence, can be used to justify actions not explicitly condemned in sacred texts. But as theologian Linda Hogan argues, “The silence of scripture must not be mistaken for divine approval” (Hogan, 2003, p. 77).

In Islam, for instance, debates around the Prophet Muhammad’s marriage to Aisha (reported to have been consummated when she was around nine years old) have led some traditional jurists to allow child marriage under Sharia. Yet modern Islamic scholars such as Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl and Dr. Kecia Ali argue that such historical acts must be read within their sociocultural context and cannot be transplanted uncritically into contemporary legal and moral frameworks. As Abou El Fadl asserts:

“To accept child marriage today as legitimate under Islam is to deny the Qur’anic emphasis on mercy, justice, and dignity” (Abou El Fadl, 2001, p. 245).


4. Child Marriage, Islamic Law, and Reformist Discourse

While many Islamic legal schools technically allow marriage upon physical signs of puberty—sometimes as early as age nine—there is growing consensus among reformist Muslim scholars and human rights advocates that such permissions conflict with the moral trajectory of the Qur’an and the modern understanding of childhood. Organizations such as Musawah and Sisters in Islam have called for re-evaluation of classical fiqh in light of contemporary knowledge and ethical standards.

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), ratified by most Muslim-majority countries, defines a child as a person under 18 and explicitly condemns all forms of sexual exploitation and harmful traditional practices, including child marriage (Articles 19, 24, 34). The persistence of such practices in religious communities thus poses not only a theological challenge, but a legal and humanitarian one.


5. The Moral Cost of Silence

As the parable narrates, “Not all flowers bloom again once crushed.” The psychological, emotional, and spiritual trauma experienced by children subjected to early marriage or abuse under religious sanction often results in long-term damage. The silence of religious leaders, parents, and communities—whether born of fear, reverence, or apathy—is a breach of moral responsibility.

Christian scripture echoes this warning in the words of Jesus: “If anyone causes one of these little ones who believe in me to stumble, it would be better for them to have a large millstone hung around their neck and to be drowned in the depths of the sea” (Matthew 18:6, NIV). Similarly, the Qur’an places strong emphasis on justice (`adl), protection of the weak (Surah An-Nisa 4:75), and the ethical treatment of orphans and children (Surah Al-Baqarah 2:220).


6. Toward a Theology of Protection and Justice

The time has come for religious communities to move from denial to confession, from complicity to courage. Sacred texts must be interpreted through the lens of divine justice, not archaic patriarchy. Theological ethics demands not only what is permissible, but what is righteous.

The prophetic call is not to defend the status quo, but to protect the powerless. In every tradition, the protection of children is a sacred trust. The “garden” can only thrive if the cries of the saplings are heard, honored, and defended.


7. Conclusion

The Silence of the Garden is not just a parable—it is a prophetic mirror held up to religious communities. It exposes the quiet complicity that allows injustice to masquerade as tradition, and calls for an urgent reclamation of theological ethics centered on compassion, justice, and the inviolable dignity of the child.

The garden still has hope. But hope begins with truth—and truth begins with breaking the silence.


References

  • Abou El Fadl, K. (2001). Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women. Oneworld Publications.

  • Ali, K. (2006). Sexual Ethics and Islam: Feminist Reflections on Qur’an, Hadith and Jurisprudence. Oneworld Publications.

  • Hogan, L. (2003). Keeping Faith with Human Rights. Georgetown University Press.

  • Musawah. (2020). Child Marriage in Muslim Contexts: A Rights-Based Perspective. Musawah Working Paper Series.

  • United Nations. (1989). Convention on the Rights of the Child. A/RES/44/25.

  • UNICEF. (2023). Child Marriage: Latest Trends and Future Prospects. New York: United Nations Children’s Fund.

  • Wadud, A. (1999). Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective. Oxford University Press.



 

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