Why Islamic Punishment for Adultery Appears Contradictory and Unequal

 Why Islamic Punishment for Adultery Appears Contradictory and Unequal:

An Academic Reflection
By Dr. Maxwell Shimba
Shimba Theological Institute

In Islamic jurisprudence, discussions surrounding the punishment for adultery reveal significant textual and interpretive tensions. The Qur’an, considered by Muslims to be the ultimate and infallible divine revelation, outlines a specific punishment for zina (adultery or fornication) in Surah An-Nur 24:2. The verse prescribes one hundred lashes for both the man and the woman found guilty of the act, and it stipulates that the punishment must be administered publicly in the presence of other believers. Notably, the Qur’anic text does not differentiate between offenders who are married (muhsan) and those who are unmarried (ghayr muhsan), thereby presenting a uniform penalty for all.

However, within Islamic tradition, a second layer of authority emerges through the Hadith literature—sayings and actions attributed to Prophet Muhammad. In Sahih Bukhari (Book 8, Hadith 805), the punishment of death by stoning (rajm) is introduced, particularly for married adulterers. This creates a sharp contrast with the Qur’anic prescription. The Qur’an itself, in its Arabic form, contains no reference to stoning in connection with adultery. Yet some translations and commentaries insert the term “stoning” in parentheses, signaling that it is not part of the original Arabic text but rather an interpretive addition intended to align the Qur’anic verse with hadith-based jurisprudence.

This divergence raises critical questions regarding the hierarchy of Islamic legal sources. If the Qur’an is believed to be perfect and complete, why then must hadith literature introduce a harsher penalty not explicitly stated in the Qur’anic revelation? Which source, therefore, should be considered authoritative—Allah’s law in the Qur’an or Muhammad’s rulings in the Hadith?

The issue becomes even more complex when examining how these punishments are applied in practice. Historical and contemporary reports demonstrate that women often bear the brunt of zina-related penalties. Social norms, unequal evidentiary standards, and patriarchal cultural environments contribute to disproportionate punishment of women, making the legal tradition appear heavily biased. This leads to broader theological and ethical questions: Why do the punishments attributed to Allah seem to oppress women? And why does Islamic jurisprudence, as practiced in several Muslim societies, consistently place women at a disadvantage in matters of moral and legal accountability?

These tensions continue to spark academic, religious, and human rights debates worldwide, especially concerning the nature of divine justice, the reliability of secondary Islamic sources, and the status of women within Islamic legal frameworks.

If that is the case, which one has the true authority? Is it Allah’s law in the Qur’an, or Muhammad’s Hadith?

Why is it that women alone are often the ones punished under this law?

Why are Allah’s punishments so oppressive toward women?